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Judicial Tactics in the European Court of Human Rights
Shai Dothan *

Abstract
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has been criticized for issuing harsher
judgments against developing states than it does against the states of Western Europe. It has
also been seen by some observers as issuing increasingly demanding judgments. This paper
develops a theory of judicial decision-making that accounts for these trends. In order to obtain
higher compliance rates with the judgments that promote its preferences, the ECHR seeks to
increase its reputation. The court gains reputation every time a state complies with its judgments,
and loses reputation every time a state fails to comply with its judgments. Not every act of
compliance has the same effect on the reputation of the court, however. When the judgment is
costlier, the court will gain more reputation in the case of compliance. In an effort to build its
reputation, in some cases the court will issue the costliest judgment with which it expects the
state to comply. Since the ECHR receives high compliance rates, its reputation increases, which
leads it to issue costlier judgments. The court restrains itself when facing high-reputation states
that can severely damage its reputation by noncompliance or criticism, so it demands more from
low-reputation states.
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I. I NTRODUCTION
In recent years, critics have accused the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) of bias because it issues harsher judgments against developing states
than against the states of Western Europe. Critics have also observed that the
ECHR has, over time, issued increasingly demanding judgments, judgments that
require states to take increasingly costly actions to comply with its dictates. This
paper develops a theory of judicial decision-making that may help to account for
these two trends.
The ECHR does not have an effective mechanism to enforce its
judgments. It cannot impose pecuniary or injunctive sanctions for
noncompliance. As a consequence, when a state chooses to comply with its
judgments, it does so primarily out of concern about the reputational loss
(“reputational sanction”) associated with noncompliance. The magnitude of this
reputational sanction is, in turn, influenced by the court’s reputation. The higher
the reputation of the court, the more all member states expect compliance with
its judgments; hence, the greater the reputational sanction to noncompliant
states.
In order to obtain higher compliance rates with its judgments, including
those that enable it to promote its preferences, 1 the ECHR seeks to increase its
reputation. The court gains reputation every time a state complies with one of its
judgments. A state’s decision to comply with a judgment signals that the state
foresees a high reputational sanction for noncompliance. This, in turn,
contributes to the perception of member states that the court has a high
reputation. Yet not every act of compliance has the same effect on the
reputation of the court. When the judgment is more demanding, and therefore
1

This article assumes that the ECHR has policy preferences it wants to promote regarding
the behavior of states under its jurisdiction. This is a central assumption in the literature
about judicial behavior, discussed in note 22. The court’s reputation can serve as a tool to
increase its potential to promote its preferences in the future.
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more costly to comply with, the court gains more reputation from a state’s
decision to comply with it—since the decision to comply suggests that the state
views the reputational sanction as being higher than the material cost of
compliance.
This Article posits that in some cases where the court has judicial
discretion and its judges do not have other motivations, the court, in deciding
how to act, may attempt to assess the costs to the state of various different
potential judgments. In an effort to build its reputation, it will opt to issue the
costliest judgment with which it expects the state will actually comply. Over
time, if the court implements this strategy cautiously, its reputation is likely to
increase, which in turn will enable it to issue increasingly costly judgments with
which states are likely to comply.
Over the fifty years since the ECHR was formed, it has enjoyed, by most
accounts, consistently high compliance rates with its judgments. 2 As a
consequence, its reputation has increased, which has, in turn, enabled it to issue
increasingly costly judgments. As this strategy has emerged over time, however,
states have developed their own set of strategic responses. When a state has a
repeated interaction with the court, the state may threaten not to comply with
costly judgments, even when the immediate reputational sanction it will incur is
higher than the material cost of compliance. The reason for this strategic
response is simple: the state seeks to send a credible signal to the court that it
will not comply with more costly judgments. This signal, however, is only
credible when sent by a high-reputation state, that is, a state that is widely
expected to comply and therefore can, through noncompliance, cause serious
reputational damage to the court. A high-reputation state may also respond by
complying with a judgment while simultaneously criticizing the court in order to
damage the court’s reputation without incurring the reputational sanction that
would result from noncompliance. In contrast, low-reputation states, that is,
states whose noncompliance is widely expected and therefore not terribly
damaging to the court, cannot employ this type of counter-strategy because the
harm to the court from a low-reputation state’s noncompliance is too small to
deter the court. For that reason, the court can issue especially costly judgments
or try new doctrines that increase its maneuverability in judgments issued against
low-reputation states. After such doctrines are introduced incrementally in
judgments against low-reputation states and gain legitimacy, they can be used
even against high-reputation states with lower risk of noncompliance.
Section II briefly describes the operation of the ECHR. Section III
explains the interaction between the ECHR and the states subject to its
jurisdiction. It also considers the court’s motivation to increase its reputation.
Section IV considers how states might respond to the court’s reputation2

For a discussion of ECHR compliance rates, see note 13.
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building strategy and how the court can employ counter-strategies against states
with which it has an iterated relationship. Section V concludes by demonstrating
how this theory can explain previously under-explained patterns in the court’s
behavior.

II. T HE ECHR
The ECHR is located in Strasbourg, France. Its jurisdiction covers fortyseven European states, members of the Council of Europe that are signatories
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (Convention), which founded the court. 3 Each member state has one
permanent judge on the court. 4
Either individuals or member states can apply to the court and seek a
finding of a violation of the Convention against a member state. 5 However,
almost all the cases the court has heard have been triggered by individual
applications. 6 Once the court determines that a member state violated the
Convention, remedial action must be taken. In the past, the court permitted the
state to choose the means of remediation, which ranged from individual
measures such as re-opening unfair proceedings to general measures such as
changing legislation to prevent future violations. 7 More recently, in certain cases
the court has begun requiring states to take particular actions to remedy the
violations, most commonly when only one course of action is feasible or when
the state needs to remedy a systemic problem. 8 Complying with the court’s
judgments, whether individual or general in scope, requires the state to
undertake costly actions. In addition, the ECHR may also award monetary
3

4
5
6

7
8

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1953), 213
UN Treaty Ser No 221 (hereinafter “Convention”). For further information on the court,
see European Court of Human Rights, Council of Europe, The ECHR in 50 Questions, *5
(Provisional Ed 2010), online at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/5C53ADA480F8-42CB-B8BD-CBBB781F42C8/0/FAQ_ENG.pdf (visited Mar 15, 2011). Most of
the important judgments of the court were issued by a Chamber of seven judges or by a
Grand Chamber of seventeen judges. Chambers can relinquish jurisdiction of the case in
favor of the Grand Chamber before issuing a judgment; in exceptional cases parties can
also ask to refer a case decided by a Chamber to the Grand Chamber. See Convention, Arts
30–31, 42–44.
Convention, Arts 20, 22.
Convention, Arts 33, 34.
Dragoljub Popovic, Prevailing of Judicial Activism over Self-Restraint in the Jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights, 42 Creighton L Rev 361, 372 (2009) (“[I]ndividual
applications represent more than ninety-five percent of the Court’s work.”).
See Convention, Art 46. For further information on execution of judgments, see also
Scozzari and Giunta v Italy, 35 Eur Ct HR 12, ¶ 249 (2000).
See Broniowski v Poland, (2005) 40 Eur Ct HR 21, ¶¶ 193–94 (ECHR Grand Chamber 2004);
notes 84–86 (discussing amending systemic problems).
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damages termed “just satisfaction.” 9 However, these monetary damages are
usually low compared to the costs of complying with the court’s declaratory
judgments.
The ECHR cannot enforce its judgments; it is up to the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe to monitor the correction of violations by
member states. 10 The only coercive sanction that can be used against a
recalcitrant state is expulsion from the Council of Europe. 11 This measure has
never been used against noncompliant states, rendering ineffective the threat of
its use. 12 Despite this, by most accounts, states usually comply with the court’s
judgments. 13

III. T HE C OURT ’ S S TRAT EGY
In order to understand the court’s strategy it is first important to
understand the incentives of states to comply with the court. States comply with
the court’s judgments despite the lack of substantial material sanctions. This
suggests that states may comply with the court’s judgments because they fear a
reputational sanction resulting from noncompliance. The reputation of the state
determines whether it is expected by other states to comply with the court in the
future. All else being equal, a high-reputation state is expected to comply with a
9
10
11
12

13

Convention, Art 41.
See id at Art 46(2).
See Statute of the Council of Europe (1949), Arts 3, 8, 87 UN Treaty Ser No 103.
The Committee came close to using that measure against the military dictatorship in
Greece in 1970. Greece, however, denounced the European Convention and left the
Council of Europe without being expelled, following the decision of the European
Commission of Human Rights in The Greek Case, 1969 YB Eur Conv on HR 1 (1969). See
Clare Ovey and Robin White, Jacobs and White, The European Convention On Human Rights 504
(Oxford 4th ed 2006). See also notes 71–72.
The exact compliance rates of the ECHR are very hard to measure, both because data on
the implementation of judgments can be hard to collect and because compliance can be
delayed or partial (such as paying just satisfaction while neglecting to implement general
measures). Some scholars contend that the ECHR has very high compliance rates. For
instance, see R. Ryssdal, The Enforcement System Set Up under the European Convention on Human
Rights, in M.K. Bulterman and M. Kuijer, eds, Compliance With Judgments Of International
Courts 49, 67 (“[T]o date judgments of the European Court of Human Rights have, I would
say, not only generally but always been complied with by the Contracting States concerned.
There have been delays, perhaps even some examples of what one might call minimal
compliance, but no instances of non-compliance.”). See also Andrew Moravcsik, Explaining
International Human Rights Regimes: Liberal Theory and Western Europe, 1 Eur J Intl Rel 157, 171
(1995); Laurence R. Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
Supranational Adjudication, 107 Yale L J 273, 296 (1997). However, Posner and Yoo refer to
further claims by other commentators about the court’s high compliance rates but claim
they cannot find data to prove high compliance. See Eric A. Posner and John C. Yoo,
Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 Cal L Rev 1, 65–66 (2005).
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judgment more often than a low-reputation state. 14 The past compliance
behavior of a state shapes other states’ expectations as to whether it will comply
with judgments in the future. The state will be expected to continue behaving
similarly unless significant internal changes alter its incentives. 15 Therefore, this
14

15

This Article distinguishes between high- and low-reputation states. Low-reputation states
are less expected to comply with the court; therefore, states that have a lower rate of
compliance with the court will be considered low-reputation states. The bare rate of
compliance, however, is a very rough proxy because it does not take into account the
relative cost, type of reasoning, and ex ante reputation of the state for each act of
compliance or noncompliance. Furthermore, it is hard to assess a state’s rate of compliance
because some cases of compliance can be delayed for many years. See Posner and Yoo, 93
Cal L Rev at 28 (cited in note 13). When compliance is delayed for a long time in cases that
demand new general measures, however, this may indicate that the state is less likely to
comply with the court’s judgments. The following states have had the highest number of
leading cases (cases demanding new general measures) pending before the Committee of
Ministers (which supervises their execution) for more than two years: Turkey (53), Italy
(31), Bulgaria (28), Romania (23), Russia (22), and Poland (19). Council of Europe,
Supervision of the Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights *66 (Annual
Report
2009),
online
at
http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/MONITORING/EXECUTION/Source/Publications/C
M_annreport2009_en.pdf (visited Feb 13, 2011).
Another way to learn about the rates of compliance is to assess the levels of compliance
with the Convention, as there should be a correlation between the compliance of states
with the Convention and with the court. States will not damage their reputation for
compliance with the Convention by violating it if they are going to forgo the material
benefits of this conduct by complying with the court. Therefore, the states that are
responsible for most of the cases before the court will probably also have lower reputations
for compliance with the court. Another reason for this phenomenon is that many cases
appearing before the court are repetitive cases. If a systemic problem which leads to many
individual violations is not amended despite the violations found by the court in past cases,
the same systemic problem may lead to new cases being filed, thus increasing the number
of cases lodged against that state. Repetitive cases composed about 60% of the admissible
cases in 2003. See Joshua L. Jackson, Note, Broniowski v. Poland: A Recipe for Increased
Legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights as a Supranational Constitutional Court, 39
Conn L Rev 759, 784-785 (2006). Russia, Turkey and other Eastern European states are
consistently responsible for most of the cases appearing before the court; they are
therefore typical low-reputation states. In contrast, the states of Western Europe are usually
higher reputation states. See Luzius Wildhaber, The European Court of Human Rights: The Past,
The Present, The Future, 22 Am U Intl L Rev 521, 527 (2007). For current statistics, see
European Court of Human Rights, Annual Report 2009, *11, online at
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/C25277F5-BCAE-4401-BC9BF58D015E4D54/0/Annual_Report_2009_Final.pdf (visited Feb 13, 2011) (“2009
Report”) (“[A]t the end of 2009, 119,300 allocated applications were pending before the
court, four states account for over half (55.7%) of its docket: 28.1% of the cases are
directed against Russia, 11% of the cases concern Turkey, 8.4% Ukraine and 8.2%
Romania.”).
The reputation of a state for compliance with the court can be affected by changes
occurring within the state, such as the election of a new government or a regime change,
because such changes might alter the state’s incentives and make it more or less likely to
comply. Since the state’s reputation is affected by factors other than its compliance
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Article explains how the compliance of states affects their reputation, bearing in
mind that the actual change in the state’s reputation is a result of a shift in the
beliefs of other states about future compliance.
States are concerned with their reputation for compliance with judgments
of the ECHR. This reputation, in turn, is said to be a signal of the value they
ascribe to compliance with international law and to membership in the
European and international communities. 16 A state gains reputation when it

16

behavior, states may possess different degrees of reputation even at the point they join the
treaty regime. Before the state begins its encounter with the court, other states have prior
beliefs about the state’s future compliance behavior, based on its actions in other arenas;
those beliefs determine the state’s preliminary reputation. The limited life span of the
governments that determine the state’s behavior might lead to a focus on short-term gain
while discounting long-term benefits like acquiring reputation. The model brackets those
possible effects on the state’s reputation and compliance behavior. Similar effects distorting
states’ reputation for compliance with international law are analyzed in Rachel Brewster,
Unpacking the State’s Reputation, 50 Harv Intl L J 231, 249 (2009).
States benefit from their reputation for several reasons. First, a high reputation signals that
the state has a low discount rate; it is willing to suffer immediate costs, such as complying
with the judgment, in order to gain long-term benefits, such as increasing its reputation. A
low discount rate makes the state a more credible treaty partner and improves its bargaining
position against other states. A similar argument is presented regarding reputation for
compliance with international law in Andrew Guzman, How International Law Works: A
Rational Choice Theory 35 (Oxford 2008). Second, as Section IV shows, the court will be
more restrained when facing high-reputation states. Third, a high-reputation state can
manipulate the reputation of the states interacting with it by criticizing or praising their
actions; therefore, a high-reputation state has more power in its interaction with other
states.
The state’s reputation for compliance with the court is one of the factors affecting the
state’s reputation for compliance with international law (“compliance reputation”). The
state’s compliance reputation is affected by several other aspects of the state’s behavior
besides complying with the court’s judgment. Signing the Convention and adhering to the
jurisdiction of the court can signal the state’s commitment to international law and increase
its compliance reputation. This is one reason that states join human rights treaties. See
Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? 111 Yale L J 1935, 2002
(2002). An application lodged against the state can harm its reputation by signaling that an
applicant believes the state broke its commitments. If the state cooperates with the court’s
proceedings, it may somewhat improve its compliance reputation. When the final decision
of the court is published, if the state is found not to have violated the treaty, this rebuilds
its compliance reputation. The court’s power to exonerate states from blame is another
reason states join its jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the state is found to violate the
treaty, its compliance reputation will be damaged. In the final stage, if the state complies
with the demands of the court in the judgment against it, it may partly rebuild its
compliance reputation, but if it disobeys the court, its compliance reputation will be further
damaged. This Article focuses only on the effect on the state’s reputation in this final stage,
which forms the state’s reputation for compliance with the court. The ability of the state to
partly rebuild its reputation by complying with the court’s demands also increases the state’s
interest in joining the court system and provides a general reason for referring disputes to
courts or arbitrators. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J Legal Stud 115, 126 (1992).
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complies with an ECHR judgment and loses reputation when it fails to comply.
A state will comply if the reputational payoff (the reputational gain for
compliance plus the avoided reputational loss the state would have incurred for
noncompliance) is higher than the material costs of complying with the
judgment. 17
When compliance or noncompliance is unexpected, it creates a stronger
signal, since it requires a greater revision of other member states’ prior beliefs.
Therefore a high-reputation state, which is expected to comply with judgments,
will earn a smaller reputational benefit from compliance than a low-reputation
state, which is viewed as less likely to comply with judgments. However, a highreputation state would suffer a greater reputational loss from noncompliance
than a low-reputation state would suffer from noncompliance. States are
generally expected to comply with international law, and states in the European
Council are especially expected to comply with ECHR judgments. 18 Therefore,
states will generally lose more reputation for noncompliance than they will earn
for compliance. The total reputational payoff is higher for high-reputation states
because of the greater impact of losses associated with noncompliance
compared to the gains for compliance. States will comply if their reputational
payoffs are higher than the material costs of compliance with the judgment.
Because high-reputation states have higher reputational payoffs, they have a
stronger incentive to comply, making the expectation that they will comply in
more cases a reasonable one.
When the material cost of compliance with the judgment is higher, states
are less likely to comply than when facing less costly judgments. States must
balance the financial costs of compliance against the reputational costs of
noncompliance. The least costly response to a high-cost judgment is likely
noncompliance; the lower the cost of the judgment, the more likely it is that a
state’s efficient response will be to comply with the judgment. No one but the
state can know precisely the true cost of the judgment. Costs can include not
17

18

Notice that this calculation is slightly more complex than the one attempted by Guzman in
Guzman, How International Law Works at 74–75 (cited in note 16). According to Guzman, at
least one action, either compliance or noncompliance, will generate a change in the
reputation of the state because at least one of these actions is not expected. According to
my theory, both compliance and noncompliance will always generate a change in the
reputation of the state. I therefore need to compute both the reputational gain from
compliance and the reputational cost from noncompliance. The reason for building the
theory this way is that I assume it is impossible for the observing states to know the exact
cost of the judgment for the state; therefore, observing states have only assessments of
expected probabilities of compliance.
Regarding states in general, see the famous stipulation in Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave:
Law And Foreign Policy 47 (Council on Foreign Relations 2d ed 1979) (“[A]lmost all nations
observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the
time.”). States are especially likely to comply with the ECHR. See note 13.
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only monetary payments, but also political costs or the loss of security or
income. However, the court and the observing states can assess the likely cost of
compliance to the state; therefore the court and observing states can know if the
cost is high or low relative to the costs of other judgments, and assess the
probability it will be higher than the state’s reputational payoff. When the court
issues a costly judgment, states are considered less likely to comply with it, so if
they do comply, they will earn more reputation, but if they do not comply, they
will lose less reputation. Since losses are usually higher than gains, states also
have a lower reputational incentive to comply with costly judgments. 19
When the court issues a judgment that is well anchored in the Convention,
the judgment will be considered more legitimate and noncompliance will signal a
greater disrespect for the Convention system and cause greater damage to the
state’s reputation. Noncompliance with a judgment showing significant judicial
discretion will be considered as a less severe violation by other states and will
lead to a lower reputational sanction. When the reasoning of the court is in line
with its previous precedents, this masks the discretion of the judges in this case.
If the decision of the court is unanimous, this also reduces the appearance of
judicial discretion and increases the legitimacy of the judgment. 20
When the court has a high reputation, the state is expected to comply with
its ruling. Therefore, states face a higher reputational payoff when they are
facing high-reputation courts. This will make the state more willing to comply
with costly judgments. 21
19

20

21

A more demanding judgment might in some cases signal that the initial violation of the
state is more severe. In that case the state’s reputation for compliance with international law
will suffer a greater damage from the judgment itself and a still greater damage by the
state’s failing to comply with it. However, this Article is focused on reputation for
compliance with the court, while bracketing other possible influences on the state’s
behavior, including broader considerations of its reputation for compliance with
international law. If the judgment is more demanding, either because there is a severe
violation or the court decided to use a stricter standard, noncompliance by the state will not
signal that it does not value its reputation for compliance with the court’s judgment as
much as would noncompliance with a less demanding judgment.
Not only unanimity but also greater consensus among the judges can increase the
legitimacy of the decision. See Walter F. Murphy, Elements of Judicial Strategy 66 (Chicago
1964) (“In the judicial process a 5–4 decision emphasizes the strength of the losing side
and may encourage resistance and evasion. The greater the majority, the greater the
appearance of certainty and the more likely a decision will be accepted and followed in
similar cases.”).
States will earn less reputation for compliance with high-reputation courts than for
compliance with low-reputation courts, but will lose more reputation for noncompliance.
Since states are generally expected to comply, the losses from noncompliance will be higher
than the gains from compliance, leaving the state with a higher reputational payoff when
facing high-reputation courts. It is possible that a state that faces a very low-reputation
court will earn a lot from compliance and lose little from noncompliance; this state’s overall
payoff may in some cases be similar to a state facing a high-reputation court that will earn
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Turning to the behavior of the ECHR, it is useful to begin from the
standard assumption that the ECHR, like other courts, has certain policy
preferences that it seeks to promote with respect to the behavior of states under
its jurisdiction. 22 In order to improve its chances of obtaining compliance with
its future judgments, the court tries to increase its reputation by increasing the
reputational sanction on noncomplying states. A court with a high reputation
has better chances of obtaining compliance to similar judgments than does a

22

little from compliance but lose a lot from noncompliance. This Article, however, assumes
that the ECHR’s reputation is consistently high enough that even the highest payoff from
compliance is lower than the lowest payoff from noncompliance.
Theories regarding the motivation of courts or judges could be divided into four types of
models according to the level of their sophistication. The first model is the legal model,
which claims that judges simply uphold the law. The second model is the attitudinal model,
which claims that judges follow their sincere policy preferences. The third group of models
is comprised of the strategic account, which claims that judges can act strategically to
ensure that their preferences will be followed, taking into account the reactions of other
actors. For a similar ordering of the first three types of models, see Jeffrey A. Segal and
Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited 44–114 (Cambridge
2002). This Article is a part of a fourth group of models; it describes how courts act
strategically to promote a long-term goal. The court is not concerned only with compliance
in the case at hand; it is instead willing to risk noncompliance in the case at hand in order to
increase its future chances of compliance by increasing its reputation. For a long-term
strategic model, claiming that courts try to increase their future latitude of possible
decisions that will not incur an override by the legislature, see Omri Yadlin, Judicial Activism
and Judicial Discretion as a Strategic Game, 19 Bar Ilan Uni L Rev 665 (2003) (Hebrew). For a
brief discussion of courts’ deciding cases according to long-term interests, see Lee Epstein
and Jack Knight, The Choices Justices Make 48–49 (CQ Press 1998).
Theories can be focused on the behavior of judges inside the courts (internal theories) or
on the behavior of the court as a unit (external theories), like the theory discussed here.
Epstein and Knight also distinguish between internal and external strategies. Id at 138.
This theory does not claim that other theories have no explanatory power. If the law is
clear, the court might follow the legal model instead of acting strategically. If individual
judges have strong preferences in the case at hand, they may follow the attitudinal model or
a short-term strategy model. The theory presented here will be particularly relevant when
there is room for judicial discretion and the judges’ preferences are not intense.
In order for the theory to apply, judges in the court need not be aware of those tactics. My
claim is only that the court acts as if it intentionally follows this strategy. Tactics might have
evolved for different reasons. One possibility is that tactics can evolve in a process of
natural selection: types of behavior that aided the court’s reputation will be repeated, and
behaviors that damaged it will be abandoned. Axelrod presents three reasons for the
disappearance of bad strategies in favor of better strategies: 1) Learning—strategies that
proved successful in the past are repeated; 2) Imitation—strategies that proved successful
for others are imitated; and 3) Selection—institutions or individuals that are unsuccessful
are eliminated from the game. See Robert Axelrod, The Evolution Of Cooperation 50 (Basic
1984). Courts learn in similar ways; they repeat strategies that helped their reputation in the
past and imitate strategies of other successful courts. Courts that do not learn to act
strategically will lose relevance or cease to function, leaving in operation only good
strategists.
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low-reputation court. Alternatively, a high-reputation court can increase the
demands of its judgments compared to those of a low-reputation court while
maintaining a similar risk of noncompliance. This Article focuses on the
ECHR’s ability to increase its reputation by strategically manipulating its
judgments, bracketing out other factors affecting the court’s reputation.
However, the court’s reputation is influenced by many other factors that shape
the beliefs of states about future compliance with the ECHR. Those factors may
include the individual prestige of the court’s judges, the reputation of the states
under its jurisdiction, and its institutional setting and enforcement mechanisms.
Those other factors shape the court’s preliminary reputation even before it
issues its first judgment, so changes that affect those factors may also alter the
court’s reputation.
Every time the ECHR obtains compliance with one of its judgments, this
signals to other states that the complying state views the reputational sanction as
higher than the material cost of the judgment. This also signals the state’s high
assessment of the court’s reputation, which leads other states to update their
beliefs about future compliance upward, increasing the court’s reputation. If the
court obtains compliance with a costly judgment, it will gain more reputation
than it would gain for compliance with a less costly judgment because
compliance indicates that the court’s reputation is high enough to outweigh the
higher material costs of compliance. 23 The higher the reputation of the court, the
higher the costs it can impose on the state and still obtain compliance. 24
Similarly, when the court’s reputation is high, it will obtain compliance even
from low-reputation states or when it uses unconstrained reasoning; therefore,
obtaining compliance in these cases will greatly increase the court’s reputation.
The court increases its reputation by putting that reputation to the test. In
some cases, particularly when judges have discretion and do not have intensely23

24

Similarly, David Law claims that when the court issues an unpersuasive, unpopular, or
unenforceable decision and still obtains compliance, its power will be particularly enhanced.
The reason for Law’s claim is that the court’s ability to coordinate people’s behavior using
their judgments in the future is enhanced by their having coordinated their behavior using
unpopular decisions in the past. See David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial
Review, 97 Georgetown L J 723, 780–81 (2009). John Hart Ely hints at the possibility that
issuing activist decisions makes it easier for the court to employ activism in the future. See
John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory Of Judicial Review 48 (Harvard 1980) (“[O]ne
of the surest ways to acquire power is to assert it.”).
The states that assess the reputation of the court can try to learn about the court’s
reputation from its behavior. When a court issues a costly judgment, it is signaling that it
believes its reputation is high enough to obtain compliance. This signal, however, is only
credible if the state that complies with the court has more information about the court’s
reputation than the other states. Otherwise, the court can cheat and give costlier judgments
to signal its high reputation, affecting by its actions the perception of the state that faces it.
Only if we assume that the state that faces the court makes an independent assessment of
the court’s reputation will the behavior of the court credibly signal its high reputation.
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held preferences, 25 the court may attempt to assess a state’s costs of compliance
and issue the costliest judgment that will still obtain compliance. When the court
tries to determine the costliest judgment with which a state will comply, it draws
on its assessments of the expected cost to the state, its own reputation, the
state’s reputation, and the nature of the reasoning. Together these factors
determine the reputational payoff to the state. The state is going to comply if its
reputational payoff is higher than the cost of the judgment; therefore, the court
will try to set the cost as close as possible to the reputational payoff. Because the
court cannot exactly assess the magnitude of the cost to the state ex ante, it
cannot know with certainty whether it will obtain compliance. The court will try
to walk on the brink of noncompliance, issuing the most demanding judgments
that it expects will lead to compliance, while still maintaining a small risk of
noncompliance because of the inherent uncertainty of the state’s costs. As the
court’s reputation grows, it can demand more in its judgments while still
expecting compliance and maintaining only the small irreducible risk of
noncompliance. In order to continue to walk on the brink of noncompliance,
the court must increase the demands of its judgments as its reputation grows.
Another method for walking on the brink of noncompliance is a shift to
less constrained forms of reasoning as the court’s reputation rises. By receiving
compliance even with this unconstrained reasoning, the court signals its high
reputation, since a lower-reputation court would probably not be able to obtain
compliance with a judgment using such reasoning. Unlike issuing costly
judgments that could be explained by alternative explanations—such as trying to
promote the immediate preferences of the judges—a trend towards less
constrained reasoning only damages the chances of compliance and the court’s
ability to promote its immediate preferences. Increasingly unconstrained
reasoning is therefore better explained by a theory showing the strategic longterm benefit of risk-taking. When a particular type of reasoning is used by the
court, its future use becomes more legitimate, since the court can support its
future judgment by citation to its former judgments. When the court refers to its
previous judgments, it indicates that it is acting consistently and is following the
rules set by the Convention instead of the ad hoc discretion of its judges.
Because the court cannot always choose the form of reasoning due to legal
25

Judicial discretion is bounded by the constraints imposed by the Convention. While the
Convention does constrain the ability of the court to manipulate its judgments, it leaves
room for maneuvering the reasoning, and prescribed remedies can be used strategically to
increase the court’s reputation. The court’s behavior results from a collective decision of
the judges sitting on the panel. Judges may share the interest of the court in increasing its
reputation; however, they may harbor other individual interests in shaping the result to suit
their immediate preferences or in improving their future bargaining power within the court.
In some cases judges may suppress their individual preferences to suit the court’s interest,
while in others they may follow their own preferences even against the court’s interest—for
instance, by dissenting when the court wishes to project unity.
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constraints, introducing and legitimizing more forms of reasoning increases the
court’s maneuverability. By legitimizing new forms of reasoning, especially those
that allow greater judicial discretion, the court can obtain compliance with more
costly future judgments and thus increase its ability to promote its preferences.
As the court’s reputation grows and previous use legitimizes the reasoning used
in its judgments, the court will shift to new forms of reasoning to continue to
walk on the brink of noncompliance.
If the court generally obtains compliance, its reputation will continue to
grow, allowing it to issue increasingly costly judgments and to shift to new and
less constrained forms of reasoning. If the court obtains sustained
noncompliance, its reputation will be damaged, and this will cause it to issue less
costly judgments. It is also possible that as the court gathers experience and
studies states’ compliance decisions, its assessment of the states’ costs improves,
minimizing the uncertainty about states’ compliance decisions. As the
uncertainty diminishes, the court can issue costlier judgments with the near
certainty that its judgment will lead to compliance.
By most accounts the ECHR has persistently obtained high rates of
compliance with its judgments. 26 The court has also, by most accounts, increased
the human rights standards it demands from states, thereby issuing increasingly
costly judgments. 27 Over the years the court has shifted to less constrained
methods of reasoning and has continually introduced new doctrines. The theory
presented above may provide a new framework to explain the link between these
three phenomena. According to my theory, the high rates of compliance that the
court has received over the years increased its reputation, making it possible as
well as strategically beneficial for the court to increase its demands and shift to
less constrained forms of reasoning.
The correlation between the high compliance rates that the ECHR receives
and its increasingly costly and less constrained judgments cannot prove the
existence of a causal connection between these observations. The court has
undergone an exceptional number of changes over the years; those changes may
have caused, in whole or in part, its behavior. Some of those changes—
particularly the rapid increase in the number of cases reaching the court, the
different states that have entered its jurisdiction, and the changing nature of its
26
27

See note 13.
See Paul Mahoney, Judicial Activism and Judicial Self-Restraint in the European Court of Human
Rights: Two Sides of the Same Coin, 11 Hum Rts L J 57, 67 (1990). Voeten describes the
phenomenon of increasing the demands of the court as time progresses. He claims that it
is a result of the replacement of restrained judges by activist judges because aspiring EU
members use activist judicial appointments to signal human rights commitments, and
governments supporting European integration picked more activist judges. See Erik
Voeten, The Politics of International Judicial Appointments: Evidence from the European Court of
Human Rights, 61 Intl Org 669, 670–71, 690–91 (2007).
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judgments—have also made the observations listed above extremely hard to
prove. 28 The examples that follow are therefore not an attempt to prove these
28

Besides the many problems with measuring compliance, mentioned in note 13, a simple
compliance rate is a very inaccurate proxy for the court’s reputation. Within the framework
used in this Article, the impact of every individual compliance decision on the court’s
reputation depends on the demands of the judgment, the initial reputation of the court, the
initial reputation of the state, and the type of reasoning used. All of these factors changed
markedly over the years in many of the court’s decisions. Some of these factors might have
changed due to strategic behavior by the court or the litigants as the next paragraphs
illustrate, rendering the attempt to measure the court’s reputation empirically almost
impossible. For similar selection effects problems focused on the relative demands of
judgments, see Posner and Yoo, 93 Cal L Rev at 28 (cited in note 13); Laurence R. Helfer
and Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors
Posner and Yoo, 93 Cal L Rev 899, 918–19 (2005).
Any attempts to compare empirically the court’s behavior today to its behavior before the
acceptance of Protocol 11 on November 1, 1998, must account for the significant changes
caused by the Protocol. The Protocol abolished the previous two-tiered system, under
which cases first reached the European Commission of Human Rights and only later
reached the ECHR, and replaced it with one full-time court. Protocol 11 also made
compulsory jurisdiction and individual petition mandatory, thus preventing states from
withholding their consent to individual cases and allowing individuals from all member
states to petition the court.
Acceptance of the court’s jurisdiction by many new states may have sent a signal that the
court has a high reputation and is therefore effective; this signal may have further increased
the court’s reputation or affected it in ways not explained by this Article. Increasing the
court’s jurisdiction exposed the court to many new states that have lower human rights
standards. Even if the court continues to demand the same human rights standards, its
judgments would be more demanding on the new states because they need to suffer greater
costs to comply with the same standard. Therefore, even if the costs of judgments could
be observed, the change in the characteristics of the states makes it impossible to verify
whether the increased demands of the court were caused by changing the standards
demanded by the court or by the initially lower standards of the states that entered its
jurisdiction.
The number of cases reaching the ECHR and the number of its judgments has increased
meteorically, even after the institutional change of Protocol 11. From 1955 to 1998, fortyfive thousand applications were allocated to a judicial formation, and 837 judgments were
issued. In 1999 alone, however, the ECHR saw these numbers increase to 8,400 and 177,
respectively, and then gradually increase further through 2009, during which 57,100
applications were allocated to a judicial formation, and 1,625 judgments were issued. See
2009 Report at 11–12 (cited in note 14). The rising number of cases may have increased the
court’s reputation by signaling its effectiveness in ways not predicted by the theory. The
higher volume of cases may have allowed the court to choose from a greater pool those
cases most suited to practice its strategy; at the same time it may have exhausted the court’s
time resources and made it a less competent strategist. Only empirical data can support
either of these hypotheses. A significant change in the number of cases makes measures
like the relative number of violations declared per case appearing before the court useless
because of selection effects. Possible selection effects include selection used by the court,
which may choose to focus on more cases with a higher chance of violation in order to
improve human rights standards, but can also deliberately choose to focus on cases in
which it expects compliance. Another selection effect results from the behavior of the
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observations, much less the causal connection between them. Instead, they are
meant only to provide a few illustrative examples for how the theory fits the
court’s judgments. 29
In support of his claim that the ECHR has increased its human rights
standards, Mahoney cites the Dudgeon case. 30 In Dudgeon, the criminal laws of
Northern Ireland proscribing homosexual practices between consenting adults
were found to violate the right to respect for private life protected by the
Convention. 31 Similar complaints had been dismissed at a preliminary stage
decades earlier. 32
The ECHR’s judgments regarding transsexuals serve as another example of
this trend. In Rees v United Kingdom, 33 the court ruled that a refusal to change the
registration of sex in the birth certificate of transsexuals and preventing them
from marrying a person of the sex opposite their current sex did not violate the
Convention. 34 Fifteen years later in the case of Christine Goodwin v United

29

30
31
32
33
34

applicants, who can strategically choose to bring before the court cases that have the same
probability of victory, so, as the court demands higher standards, those parties would adjust
and introduce more cases. However, if the court, in response to the greater number of
cases, resorts to deciding only the cases with the most severe violations and delays the
others—thus increasing the litigation costs of the applicants—the applicants may respond
by submitting cases with more severe violations instead. Furthermore, the states may act
strategically as well by changing their litigation strategy, thus adding another possible bias.
An increasingly large number of the cases appearing before the court are repetitive cases,
stemming from the same systemic problem that the state failed to amend. See Jackson, 39
Conn L Rev at 784-785 (cited in note 14). The existence of repetitive cases attests to
noncompliance with the court and may have therefore damaged its reputation. On the
other hand, repetitive cases inflate the court’s caseload and indicate the continuing trust of
applicants who turn to the court, which may benefit the court’s reputation. Repetitive cases
also make empirical attempts to assess the court’s compliance rates very difficult because
they highlight the problems of delayed and partial compliance and also the different
demands of different cases. The difference between the demands of different cases is
evident when considering the court’s new pilot cases, which may be significantly more
demanding since they mandate large structural changes and prevent every individual
violation from separately appearing before the court.
While focusing on a limited number of examples can serve only as anecdotal illustrations
of the theory and does not qualify as proof, they may provide a fruitful new framework for
thinking about the court while supplying the tools for future testing of the hypothesis
raised in this Article. This Article is a part of a larger project, initiated by the author’s PhD
dissertation, which compares several national and international courts and their behavior
over time and may further support the theory of judicial decision-making presented here.
See Shai Dothan, Strategy and Adaptation in the Israeli Supreme Court (unpublished draft on file
with author) (applying this theory to the Israeli Supreme Court).
Dudgeon v United Kingdom, 4 Eur Ct HR 149 (1981).
Id ¶ 63.
See Mahoney, 11 Hum Rts L J at 61–62 (cited in note 27).
Rees v United Kingdom, (1987) 9 Eur Ct HR 56 (1986).
Id ¶¶ 46, 51.

Summer 2011

129

Chicago Journal of International Law

Kingdom, 35 the court ruled that the system of birth certificates and the prevention
of marriage do, in fact, violate the Convention. 36
These examples could be explained by the willingness of the court to
follow an emerging consensus among the states of Europe. 37 However, trying to
explain those changes as resulting from an emerging consensus is subject to the
criticism that the judges refer to opinions and legal systems that conform to their
decision and ignore opinions that clash with it. Since the consensus that the
judges claim they are following does not purport to involve all states in
Europe—or even all the judges in the court 38—it is an explanation that cannot
be falsified; the claim is hard to disprove but also less convincing because it
cannot be tested. Nevertheless, pointing to cases in which the court increased its
demands when there was clearly no consensus can further reduce the validity of
this explanation. In Hirst v United Kingdom, 39 the Grand Chamber decided that a
blanket ban on prisoners’ right to vote is a violation of Article 3 of Protocol
Number 1 to the Convention, which protects the right to free elections. 40 In a
joint dissenting opinion, five judges criticized this decision as digressing from
the court’s consistent case law to leave a large margin of discretion to the states
in determining their electoral system. 41 The dissenting judges specifically called

35
36

37
38

39
40
41

Christine Goodwin v United Kingdom, 35 Eur Ct HR 18 (2002).
Id ¶¶ 93, 104. In another case decided between Rees and Goodwin, the court reiterated its
consciousness of the seriousness of the problems facing transsexuals and the need to keep
the issue under review. See Cossey v United Kingdom, (1991) 13 Eur Ct HR 622, ¶ 42 (1990).
The court has indicated a growing displeasure with the practice of the UK. See Sheffield
(Kristina) v United Kingdom, (1999) 27 Eur Ct HR 163, ¶ 60 (1998). For further discussion of
this development in the case law of the ECHR, see Beate Rudolf, Constitutional
Developments—European Court of Human Rights: Legal Status of Postoperative Transsexuals, 14 Intl
J Con L 716 (2003).
See Laurence R. Helfer, Consensus, Coherence and the European Convention on Human Rights, 26
Cornell Intl L J 133, 134 (1993).
In the Dudgeon case, the majority opinion refers to an increased tolerance towards
homosexual practices and their decriminalization in the majority of the states of Europe.
Dudgeon v United Kingdom, 4 Eur Ct HR ¶ 60. The Cypriot judge Zekia, however, wrote a
strong dissent referring to the criminalization of similar homosexual practices in Cyprus.
Dudgeon v United Kingdom, 4 Eur Ct HR ¶ 2 (1981) (Zekia dissenting). Judge Walsh in his
opinion (dissenting in part) specifically attacks the court’s argument that a European norm
has or can evolve by referring to the extreme diversity of the countries making up the
Council of Europe. Id ¶ 16.
Hirst v United Kingdom, (2006) 42 Eur Ct HR 41 (Grand Chamber 2005).
Id ¶ 85.
Hirst v United Kingdom, 42 Eur Ct HR 41, ¶¶ 2–5 (Grand Chamber 2005) (Wildhaber, Costa,
Lorenzen, Kovler, and Jebens dissenting).
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attention to the fact that there is a ban on prisoners voting in many other
countries in Europe—thus no consensus exists as to that issue. 42
The doctrines of interpretation used consistently by the ECHR show its
tendency to shift towards less constrained reasoning and judgments with which
compliance is costlier. One vehicle for constantly increasing the demands of the
court’s judgments is the doctrine of evolutionary interpretation, which suggests
that the Convention is a living instrument that should be read differently as
times change. 43 This doctrine also supports the use of novel reasoning since it
allows the court to issue judgments that are not grounded in previous precedent.
This doctrine should be considered in light of another doctrine of interpretation
used by the court: the principle of effectiveness, which renders the safeguards of
the Convention practical and effective. 44 This principle was used to increase the
human rights standards demanded by the court to insure the effectiveness of the
Convention system. A third doctrine of interpretation used by the court is
teleological interpretation. 45 The link between the three methods of
interpretation allows the court to increase the demands of its judgments
continuously. Teleological interpretation can be used to interpret the treaty in an
evolutionary fashion because the object and purpose of the treaty are flexible
and dynamic, as opposed to the text or the subjective views of the parties, which
do not change with the progress of time. Teleological interpretation can also be
used to make the Convention effective; it allows the court to read the duties of
the state expansively and read the reservations from these duties restrictively.
Over the last two decades the ECHR has embraced increasingly less
constrained methods of interpretation. 46 For example, as the next section shows,
the court recently changed its doctrine and started demanding specific actions
42

43
44
45

46

Id ¶¶ 2–3. After five years had passed and the UK failed to amend the law in accordance
with the Hirst judgment, the court issued a pilot judgment which gives the UK six months,
from the time it becomes final, to introduce legislative proposals intended to conform to
Hirst. See Case of Greens and MT v United Kingdom, Applications Nos 60041/08 and
60054/08, ¶ 115 (Nov 23, 2010) (by a Chamber of the court), online at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&source
=tkp&highlight=application%20|%20nos.%20|%2060041/08%20|%2060054/08&sessio
nid=66537804&skin=hudoc-en (visited Feb 14, 2011). While this judgment is not very
demanding compared to Hirst, since it is clear only such legislative changes can amend the
violation, it is another indication of the court’s incremental move towards more demanding
judgments.
See, for example, Tyrer v United Kingdom, (1979-80) 2 Eur Ct HR 1, ¶ 31 (1978).
See Soering v United Kingdom, 11 Eur Ct HR 439, ¶ 90 (1989).
See François Ost, The Original Canons of Interpretation of the European Court of Human Rights,
in Mireille Delmas-Marty, ed, The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights:
International Protection Versus National Restrictions 283, 292 (Martinus Nijhoff 1992).
For the claim that the court has moved over the last two decades to the use of more activist
measures of interpretation that allow for greater discretion to the judges, see Popovic, 42
Creighton L Rev at 396 (cited in note 6).
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from states instead of only finding a violation and allowing the state to choose
the means of remediation. Adopting this new doctrine is another example of the
court’s tendency to increase its demands over time, as well as another method
for increasing the court’s discretion.
The ECHR does not always have full control over the reasoning or the
remedy. Sometimes a certain remedy is obviously necessary or a certain form of
reasoning is particularly fitting. The court may try to adjust the remedy and the
reasoning so that it will not issue judgments that are too costly to be complied
with, conditioned on their reasoning. In cases where the court imposes a very
costly remedy, it may tend to adopt more constrained reasoning, or indicate that
it had little or no discretion in its decision by minimizing dissent among the
judges or by relying on precedent. When the remedy is less costly, the court may
be more inclined to draw on more novel forms of reasoning. While such a
tendency seems reasonable, it is extremely difficult to prove because other
aspects of judicial decision-making point in the opposite direction. Less
restrained forms of reasoning increase the judges’ discretion and can therefore
make more demanding judgments possible. Demanding judgments may incur
more resistance by judges and lead them to write dissents even against the
court’s interest in projecting unity.
Another strategy the court can use is adjusting the different components of
the remedy to reduce the risks of noncompliance. If the court issues a judgment
that demands substantial efforts from the state, it can accompany the judgment
with a demand for relatively low reparations; by paying those reparations the
state can partly rebuild its reputation. 47 If very low, or zero, reparations are
demanded, this may have an expressive function, suggesting the violation is less
severe. Again, this strategy is hard to prove, since judgments that expose a severe
violation may call for higher reparations to compensate the applicants for their
personal harm.
The Von Hannover case 48 illustrates the possible use of these tactics,
although it certainly cannot prove their actual use by the court. The case
47

48

For example, in the Ilascu case the court demanded that Russia take all necessary steps to
release two prisoners held in the Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria and pay a sum of
approximately 600,000 EUR as just satisfaction. The prisoners were not released until they
served their sentence, but Russia paid the just satisfaction and stated that by doing so they
fully executed the judgment. Ilascu and Others v Moldova and Russia, 40 Eur Ct HR 46,
Judgment ¶¶ 20–22 (2004); Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Interim
Resolution DH (2005), 84 (July 13, 2005). Sometimes when a fine is added to a sanction it is
perceived as a price, which allows the violator to pay it and be exonerated from blame for
the initial violation. See Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J Legal Stud 1,
13–14 (2000). Russia may try to promote an understanding that the just satisfaction is a
price it has to pay for the ability to violate, instead of a fine for violations that it has to
remedy.
Von Hannover v Germany, 40 Eur Ct HR 1 (2004) (“Von Hannover I”).
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concerned paparazzi pictures of the Princess of Monaco taken outside her home
without her knowledge and published by the tabloid press in Germany. After
several German courts discussed the issue, the case reached the Federal
Constitutional Court of Germany, which ruled that some of the photos were
publishable under German law after balancing the protection of private life
against freedom of press. The ECHR ruled that the German courts did not
balance correctly between the competing interests and did not sufficiently
protect the applicant’s private life, resulting in a breach of Article 8 of the
Convention. 49 To minimize the risks generated by overruling the German
Constitutional Court, the ECHR decided the case unanimously, thus suggesting
the lack of discretion in its decision. 50 To further minimize the risks of the
judgment by lowering the stigma on Germany, the court did not decide the issue
of just satisfaction and invited the parties to agree on this point. 51

IV. FACING THE S TATE ’ S S TRATEGY
When a state complies with a costlier judgment, it will earn more
reputation, but it will have to bear a higher material cost than it would when
complying with a less costly judgment. Therefore, a state might rather comply
with less costly judgments than comply with costlier judgments. Noncompliance
with a costly judgment will cost the state reputation and usually leave it worse
off than in cases of compliance. 52 Noncompliance with a less costly judgment
would be even worse, since the reputational sanction will be higher. The court
earns the most reputation when it obtains compliance with a costly judgment;
receiving compliance with a less costly judgment will earn the court less
reputation. Noncompliance with a costly judgment will cause the court
reputational damage, but noncompliance with a less costly judgment will result
in even more reputational damage to the court.

49
50
51

52

Id ¶¶ 78–80.
The judgment of the court was joined by two concurring opinions.
Von Hannover I, 40 Eur Ct Hr ¶ 85. Despite requests from news organizations in Germany,
Germany did not appeal the case to the Grand Chamber and reached a friendly settlement
leading to the striking of the case from the list of the court’s pending cases. This may be a
testimony to the effectiveness of the court’s strategy, as well as to Germany’s high
reputation, which prompted it to comply to avoid serious reputational damage. See
Professional Publishers Association, German government refuses to appeal against Princess Caroline
decision
(Sept
2,
2004),
online
at
http://www.ppa.co.uk/press-andmedia/news/2004/september/german-government-refuses-to-appeal-against-princesscaroline-decision (visited Feb 14, 2011); Von Hannover v Germany (2006) 43 Eur Ct HR 7, ¶¶
8–9 (2005) (“Von Hannover II”).
The court will try not to issue judgments in which the state’s reputational payoff is lower
than the material cost of avoiding noncompliance.
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When the interaction between the court and the state is not iterated, the
court will try to give the costliest judgment with which the state has an interest
in complying—namely, a judgment that sets the material cost of compliance as
only slightly lower than the state’s reputational payoff. Once this judgment is
given, the state should comply—the best possible outcome for the court. If all
states comply with the court to suit their immediate reputational interest, the
court’s reputation will increase, and the court will shift towards costlier
judgments, ultimately damaging the states’ interest.
If the interaction between the court and a certain state is iterated, the state
may respond strategically to the court’s behavior. The state can signal to the
court that it will not comply with costly judgments, even if it will suffer an
immediate reputational sanction that is greater than the material cost of the
judgment. 53 This signal will force the court to restrain itself and shift to less
costly judgments to avoid the possibility of noncompliance.
For the state’s signal to be credible, it must be able to withstand the
reputational cost it suffers for noncompliance more easily than the ECHR can
sustain the damage to its own reputation caused by the state’s noncompliance.
While high-reputation states suffer more damage than low-reputation states for
each instance of noncompliance, noncompliance by a high-reputation state can
cause the court much more damage than noncompliance by a low-reputation
state. This Article assumes that the significant damage caused to the court by the
noncompliance of a high-reputation state means that high-reputation states can
sustain their noncompliance more readily than the court can withstand it. For
that reason, high-reputation states can credibly threaten not to comply, even
though their short-term reputational interests may suffer.
Low-reputation states pose no credible threat to the court, since their
noncompliance will cause the court only minimal damage. Therefore, despite the
fact that a low-reputation state stands to lose less than a high-reputation state for
every individual act of noncompliance, this Article posits that in a direct
confrontation between the court and a low-reputation state, the state will yield
first. Theoretically, several low-reputation states may collude and decide
collectively not to comply with costly judgments of the court, and their collective
response may be damaging enough to the court’s reputation to make it restrain
itself. For such collusion to work, however, the colluding states must be able to
prevent free-riding by each individual state in the form of compliance with
judgments that cost less than the reputational sanction of noncompliance.
Furthermore, in order to be deterred, the court must be aware of the pact
between the states, but making this agreement public can by itself cause
53

The state needs to commit not to comply even against its short term interest. See Thomas
C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict 41, 48 (Harvard 1960) (describing a similar situation of
commitment to a conditional choice and showing that when an interaction is iterated a
party can demonstrate its commitment during the first few rounds).
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reputational damage to those states, making such a collusion very unlikely. While
low-reputation states may continue not to comply with the court when the
material cost of the judgment is higher than the reputational cost of
noncompliance—a phenomenon that accounts for their high rates of
noncompliance compared to those of high-reputation states—they cannot
credibly signal to the court that they will not comply with future judgments even
against their reputational interest.
Because the court is aware of the fact that it cannot withstand
noncompliance by a high-reputation state, high-reputation states may not even
need to refuse to comply with the court; they can use the mere threat of
noncompliance to subdue the court. The court will restrain itself in advance
when facing high-reputation states, preventing the need for noncompliance.
If a high-reputation state is especially concerned about its reputation, but
still wants to signal its disapproval of the court’s judgments, it can use the milder
response of criticizing the court and suffer only the smaller reputational sanction
resulting from such criticism. Even criticism by a high-reputation state can
damage the court; like noncompliance, criticism indicates the state does not fear
the reputational loss associated with conflict with the court. Therefore, criticism
will damage the court’s reputation, although perhaps to a lower extent than
noncompliance. Criticism can also marshal public opinion within the state
against the court in a way that may make future noncompliance—or even exit
from the treaty—inevitable due to the demands of the public. If the state cannot
credibly threaten not to comply or to exit, it may use criticism to change the
conditions in a way that may render future noncompliance or exit inevitable in
some circumstances. 54
Criticism of the court’s judgments by states can also indicate displeasure
with the court’s decision-making. If the court is believed to issue unjust or
incorrect judgments, states will be less pressured to comply, indirectly decreasing
the court’s reputation. The perception of the court’s judgments affects the
reputational sanction for noncompliance and therefore the court’s reputation.
High-reputation states will usually be better able to affect the perception other
states have of the court’s judgments, allowing them even greater leverage against
the court.
54

The countermeasures that states can use against the court could be arranged from the
strongest measure of leaving the treaty regime, to the intermediate measure of
noncompliance, to the weakest measure of criticism. States may want to use the threat of
exiting the treaty or noncompliance to coerce the court, but this threat may not be credible
because of the high costs of exit or noncompliance for the state. Therefore, the state may
attempt a practice Schelling terms brinkmanship, deliberately increasing the chances that
retreating from the use of the most extreme measures will be impossible. Id at 199–201.
Criticizing the court may change internal public opinion in a way that may make it hard or
impossible to remain in the treaty regime or to continue complying with the court, and it
can therefore be tried as a strategy of brinkmanship.
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The contrast between the court’s behavior towards Russia and England
illustrates this interaction. The ECHR has been mounting a sustained campaign
against Russia regarding its military operation in Chechnya in 1999–2000. In May
2009 the court delivered its hundredth judgment regarding this military
campaign, and over a hundred judgments are still pending. 55 In those judgments,
Russia is accused of severe violations of the Convention, including extra-judicial
killings and torture. 56 The court can continue issuing those judgments even if
Russia criticizes it or delays compliance because the losses to its reputation are
sustainable. 57 On the other hand, when the judgment of Osman v the United
Kingdom 58 provoked severe academic criticism in England, the court retreated
from this judgment in Z and Others v United Kingdom. 59 In Osman, the victims of an
obsessive killer claimed they were not protected by the police, although they
gave the police ample warnings of their concerns. The domestic courts rejected
P5F

P56F

P57F

P58F

P

P

P

P59F

55
56
57

58
59

P

P

Russian Justice Initiative, Russia and the European Court of Human Rights, online at
http://www.srji.org/en/echr/russia/ (visited Feb 14, 2011).
See, for example, Magomed Musayev and Others v Russia, Application No 8979/02, slip op, ¶¶
92, 122 (ECHR 2008).
The court also forms another type of reputation, a reputation for not being deterred by
noncompliance and maintaining its course despite resistance. Such a reputation may deter
states from noncompliance in future instances. If full Russian compliance with the court’s
judgments in this area seems impossible or even very improbable, the incentive of the court
to restrain itself in order to increase the chances of compliance is eroded. Instead, the
court may opt to issue even costlier judgments, since noncompliance with such judgments
will serve as only a weaker negative reputational signal.
Russian compliance is closely monitored by the Committee of Ministers, but still remains
partial. Department for the Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human
Rights, Actions of the security forces in the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation: general measures
to comply with the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, Memorandum CM/Inf/DH
33, Part I (Sept 11, 2008). Russian criticism against the court has been severe; the former
president of the court, Luzius Wildhaber, has even claimed the Russians poisoned him.
Luke Harding, I Was Poisoned by Russians, Human Rights Judge Says (Guardian International
Feb 1, 2007), online at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/feb/01/russia.topstories3
(visited Feb 14, 2011).
Until January 15, 2010, Russia persistently withheld the ratification of Protocol 14, which
allows changes that are urgently needed to assist the court in battling its mounting caseload.
Russia is the last nation in Europe to withhold ratification. The recent decision of the
Russian state Duma to approve the protocol may be a new sign of Russia’s willingness to
assist the court. Council of Europe Directorate of Communication, Press Release: Russian
Approval of Protocol 14—A Commitment to Europe: Statement by Secretary General of the Council of
Europe,
Thorbjørn
Jagland
(Jan
15,
2010),
online
at
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1571749&Site=DC&BackColorInternet=F5CA75&
BackColorIntranet=F5CA75&BackColorLogged=A9BACE (visited Feb 14, 2011).
Following Russia’s decision to ratify Protocol 14, the Protocol came into force on June 1,
2010.
Osman v United Kingdom, 29 Eur Ct HR 245 (1998).
Z and Others v United Kingdom, 34 Eur Ct HR 3 (2001).
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their suit against the police without deciding the merits. The ECHR decided that
although Article 2 protecting the right to life was not violated, Article 6
protecting the right to access to a court was violated. 60 The decision regarding
the violation of Article 6 was criticized in an article published in the Modern
Law Review. 61 In Z, children who were ill-treated by their parents were not
removed from parental control until after several years of abuse, resulting in
severe psychological injuries. The court decided there was a violation of Article 3
preventing inhuman and degrading treatment, but although the suit against the
authorities was dismissed in a way very similar to Osman, the court decided there
was no violation of Article 6. 62 Five judges in two separate dissents criticize the
decision not to find a violation of Article 6 as contrary to the Court’s decision in
Osman. 63
The court will therefore avoid giving extremely costly judgments against
high-reputation states, so as not to provoke them into strategic noncompliance.
Because high-reputation states can also lose more through noncompliance than
through compliance, however, they are less likely to be provoked to
noncompliance by less costly judgments. In some cases, this would allow the
court to continue issuing judgments against them. As an analogy, consider the
relationship between good friends or business partners—while they will not
attempt major transgressions against each other since they know that they can
cause each other substantial damage merely by terminating their relationship,
they may attempt minor transgressions since each side knows the other will not
hurry to cut a relationship that is also beneficial for her. 64
Proving that the ECHR issues costlier judgments against low-reputation
states seems impossible. The first problem is that the states’ exact costs are not
observable to an outsider and are also incommensurable. Even judgments that
demand similar actions, such as paying the same amount of money, can be more
60
61
62
63

64

Osman, 29 Eur Ct HR ¶¶ 122, 154.
Conor Gearty, Unravelling Osman, 64 Mod L Rev 159 (2001).
Z and Others, 34 Eur Ct HR ¶¶ 75, 104.
Z and Others v United Kingdom, 34 Eur Ct HR 3, ¶ 3 (2001) (Rozakis and Palm dissenting in
part); Z and Others v United Kingdom, 3 Eur Ct HR 3, ¶ 1 (2001) (Thomassen, Casadevall, and
Kovler dissenting in part). This retreat is explained as a response to the arguments in
Gearty’s article (cited in note 61). See Jane Wright, The Retreat from Osman: Z v United
Kingdom in the European Court of Human Rights and Beyond, in Duncan Fairgrieve, Mads
Andenas, and John Bell, eds, Tort Liability of Public Authorities in Comparative Perspective 55, 63
(British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2002). However, the court in the
case of Z and Others did find a violation of Article 13, protecting the right to an effective
remedy for violations of the Convention. Z and Others, 34 Eur Ct HR ¶ 111.
A similar phenomenon will occur in close-knit communities. Ellickson shows that farmers
in Shasta County will suffer minor transgressions from each other, but they will usually not
attempt to sue each other, which constitutes a major transgression. See Robert C. Ellickson,
Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes 56, 60–61 (Harvard 1991).
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demanding on certain states because of their lower financial assets or the
political implications of the judgment. The preliminary condition of the states
before the judgment is also very different, with high-reputation states usually
having higher human rights standards. Therefore, even if the court demands
exactly the same standard of human rights protection from high-reputation and
low-reputation states, the judgment will be much more demanding on the lowreputation states, providing a credible alternative explanation for the court’s
apparent preference for high-reputation states. The court is also trying to
maintain an image of impartiality and will therefore try to hide any sign of bias.
To do that, the court may even deliberately change its actions strategically, for
instance by issuing costly judgments against high-reputation states or restraining
itself when facing low-reputation states to refute the double standards claim.
The following examples therefore do not attempt to prove that the ECHR is
noticeably more demanding on low-reputation states or that the reason for such
bias is the strategic calculation described above rather than other possible
explanations. They are only meant to illustrate how the court’s behavior fits this
strategic calculation.
The contrast between The Greek Case 65 and Lawless v Ireland 66 illustrates the
court’s tendency to issue costlier judgments against low-reputation states and be
more lenient towards high-reputation or democratic states. 67 The Lawless case
concerned the detention without trial of G.R. Lawless, a former member of the
Irish Republican Army (IRA). The detention of Lawless was part of an effort by
the Irish government to suppress the military activities of the IRA in Northern
Ireland. In this case, the court ruled that detention without trial contradicted
Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention. 68 However, the court also found that the
detention was founded on the right of derogation duly exercised by the Irish
government in accordance with Article 15 of the Convention. 69 Because the Irish
government derogated from the Convention according to the prescriptions of
Article 15, no breach of the Convention was found in this case. 70 In contrast, the
65
66

67

68
69
70

The Greek Case, 1969 YB Eur Conv on HR.
Lawless v Ireland (No 3), 1 Eur Ct HR (ser A) (1961). The Lawless case was the first case
decided by the court; therefore, the court’s restraint can also be explained by practicing
greater caution when its reputation is low.
This claim is raised with regard to these cases in Brendan Mangan, Protecting Human Rights in
National Emergencies: Shortcomings in the European System and a Proposal for Reform, 10 Hum Rts
Q 372, 383 (1988); Fionnuala Ni Aolain, The Emergence of Diversity: Differences in Human Rights
Jurisprudence, 19 Fordham Intl L J 101, 114 (1995); Frede Castberg, The European Convention
On Human Rights 169 (A.W. Sijthoff 1974); Joan F. Hartman, Derogation from Human Rights
Treaties in Public Emergencies, 22 Harv Intl L J 1, 3–4 (1981).
Lawless, 1 Eur Ct HR ¶ 7.
Id ¶ 30.
Id ¶ 48.
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European Commission of Human Rights’ report on The Greek Case found that
no public emergency existed in Greece, a precondition for derogating from the
Convention. 71 Greece, where a military government ruled at the time, was
therefore found in breach of the Convention. 72
Another example illustrating the ECHR’s restraint when facing highreputation states is the case of Bankovic and Others v Belgium and Others. 73 Bankovic
and other citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia lodged a complaint
against seventeen members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) 74 alleging their responsibility for violations of the Convention because
of the killing of several people in a NATO air strike. This application concerned
all the high-reputation, powerful states of Western Europe. The court concluded
that the case was not admissible since the persons injured were not under the
jurisdiction of the respondent states. 75
The narrow reading of jurisdiction in the Bankovic case can be compared to
a more expansive reading in other cases decided against low-reputation states. In
the case of Loizidou v Turkey, 76 where a Cypriot national claimed she was denied
the enjoyment of her property (plots of land located in Northern Cyprus) by
Turkey, the ECHR ruled Turkey had jurisdiction although the violation was
committed outside its territory. 77 The court stated that jurisdiction resulted from
the exercise of effective control by Turkey over the territory in question. 78 In a
71
72

73
74

75
76
77
78

The Greek Case, 1969 YB Eur Conv on HR ¶ 169.
Following the decision in The Greek Case, the Greek government denounced the
Convention on December 12, 1969. The case was not referred to the court within three
months and was therefore referred to the Committee of Ministers, which decided that
Greece had violated numerous articles of the Convention. Note that before the court
became very active, important cases like The Greek Case were not referred to the court and
were therefore decided by the Committee, which could find a violation with a two-thirds
majority. See Mark W. Janis, Richard S. Kay, and Anthony W. Bradley, European Human Rights
Law: Text And Materials 27 (Oxford 3d ed 2008). Greece refused to take part in the
discussions at the Committee of Ministers, due to its denunciation of the Convention and
the Commission’s Report. See Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe,
Resolution DH(70)1 (Apr 15, 1970).
Bankovic and Others v Belgium and Others (Admissibility), (2007) 44 Eur Ct HR SE5 (2001).
The NATO members named in the complaint were Belgium, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.
Bankovic, 44 Eur Ct HR ¶ 82.
Loizidou v Turkey, (1997) 23 Eur Ct HR 513 (1996).
Id ¶ 47.
Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections), 20 Eur Ct HR (Ser A), ¶ 62 (1995); Loizidou, 23 Eur
Ct HR ¶ 52. See Alexandra Ruth and Mirja Trilsch, Bankovic v Belgium (Admissibility), in
Bernard H. Oxman, ed, International Decisions, 97 Am J Intl L 168, 172 (2003) (criticizing the
attempt to distinguish the cases by claiming that the precedent set in Loizidou and another
case, Cyprus v Turkey, (2002) 35 Eur Ct HR 30, ¶ 74 (ECHR 2001), is preserving a
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later case, Ilascu v Moldova and Russia, the court found Moldova responsible for
actions in a territory it did not in fact control. 79 In his partly dissenting opinion,
Judge Loucaides criticized the gulf between this decision and the court’s decision
in Bankovic. 80
Another way the ECHR can take greater risks regarding low-reputation
states is by trying novel forms of reasoning in the judgments issued against
them. After the court uses that form of reasoning in one case, it becomes more
entrenched and legitimate if applied in future cases. This allows the court to
issue costlier judgments against high-reputation states using the same type of
reasoning in the future. The court can therefore use low-reputation states to set
a precedent for a certain form of reasoning that can later be used to issue costly
judgments against high-reputation states.
In Broniowski v Poland, 81 the applicant was one of a group of tens of
thousands of Polish citizens who were repatriated from territories lost to Poland
following World War II. The judgment found that the legal arrangements made
by the Polish government to compensate the applicant for the loss of his
property were inadequate, and as a result the applicant suffered a
disproportionate part of the burden on the community. For that reason, the
court found a violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1 protecting the right to
property. 82 The revolutionary part of the judgment was that the judgment did
not only state that Poland was in breach of the Convention, it specified exactly
the actions that Poland had to take to remedy this violation regarding all other
claimants. Poland had to secure the implementation of the property rights of the
remaining claimants or provide them with equivalent redress in lieu of
property. 83 The court was using this judgment to identify for the first time a
systemic problem with compliance to the Convention, making this a so-called
“pilot judgment.” 84 It is not mere coincidence that this new type of reasoning

79
80
81
82
83
84

protection of the Convention only where it was previously enjoyed, and claiming that this
argument was first used by the ECHR to expand the state’s extraterritorial jurisdiction and
was transformed in Bankovic into an argument to limit the state’s jurisdiction); Alexander
Orakhelashvili, Restrictive Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties in the Recent Jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights, 14 Eur J Intl L 529, 545 (2003) (criticizing the Court’s
decision regarding jurisdiction in Bankovic as a digression from the Convention organs’
previous jurisprudence).
Ilascu, 40 Eur Ct HR ¶ 330–31.
Ilascu and Others v Moldova and Russia, 40 Eur Ct HR 46, ¶ 1 (2004) (Loucaides dissenting in
part).
Broniowski v Poland, (2005) 40 Eur Ct HR 21 (Grand Chamber 2004).
Id ¶ 187.
Id ¶¶ 193–94.
See Jackson, 39 Conn L Rev at 791 (cited in note 14). The court is following the Committee
of Ministers’s invitation to identify systemic problems. See Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe, Res(2004)3 (May 12, 2004).
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was used for the first time against a low-reputation state like Poland. 85 Similar
systemic problems in high-reputation states did not give rise to similar decisions
until after the precedent was formed in the Broniowski case—and even then only
with restraint and caution. 86

85

86

In fact, the court had tried to introduce this new type of non-declaratory judgment
incrementally in previous cases. Jackson, 39 Conn L Rev at 783–84 (cited in note 14).
Jackson compares Assanidze v Georgia, 39 Eur Ct HR 32, ¶ 203 (2004) (demanding the
applicant’s release “at the earliest possible date”; the applicant was released on April 9,
2004, one day after the judgment was given) with Ilascu, 40 Eur Ct HR ¶ 490 (progressing
further by demanding that the respondent countries secure the “immediate release” of the
applicants). Jackson explains that prior to Broniowski, the court demanded direct actions
only when there was only one possible course to remedy the violation. Also note that all
those cases were decided against Eastern European states, which are usually considered to
have a low reputation; this supports the hypothesis that the court progresses its precedents
by using novel forms of reasoning against low-reputation states.
See Wojciech Sadurski, Partnering with Strasburg: Constitutionalisation of the European Court of
Human Rights, The Accession of Central and East European States to the Council of Europe and the
Idea of Pilot judgments, 9 Hum Rts L Rev 397, 430 (2009). Sadurski claims that a similar
systemic problem used to exist in England regarding widow benefits for men, but the court
failed to identify a systemic problem, perhaps for fear of retaliation. On November 23,
2010, the court issued a rather mild pilot judgment against the UK regarding the issue of
voting rights for prisoners. See Case of Greens and M.T., Applications Nos 60041/08 and
60054/08, ¶¶ 110–22. By now the pilot judgment tool has become less novel. After
Broniowski, the court identified a systemic problem in the Case of Sejdovic v Italy, (2006) 42
Eur Ct HR 17 (2004), because the Italian legal system did not afford an effective
mechanism to secure the rights of persons convicted in absentia. Id ¶ 44. Still, Sadurski
claims that the court shows special restraint against Italy, since in the following Grand
Chamber judgment and in all other Italian cases decided by the Grand Chamber, the court
did not include a finding of a systemic violation in the operative part of the judgment.
Sadurski, 9 Hum Rts L Rev at 427. See Sejdovic v Italy, Judgment, No 56581/00, 2006 WL
5003056, ¶¶ 121–27 (Grand Chamber 2006). It should be noted regarding the Sejdovic
case, however, that in the meantime Italy instituted a reform, which changed the legal
situation regarding some potential applicants, and the court decided it would be premature
to check if a systemic problem existed after the reform. The court did not show restraint,
however, in another case decided against Poland, Hutten-Czapska v Poland, (2007) 45 Eur Ct
HR 4 (Grand Chamber 2006). In this case as well, the court found in the operative part of
the judgment that a systemic problem existed because the legal situation in Poland imposes
restrictions on landlords’ rights and does not allow them to recover losses incurred in
connection with property maintenance. Id at Judgment ¶ 3. In order to remedy this
problem, the court ruled that Poland must secure a mechanism maintaining a fair balance
between the interests of landlords and the general interest of the community. Id at
Judgment ¶ 4. Though it appears the court is using pilot judgments against low-reputation
states like Poland, it is also trying to use this measure where there is some chance of
compliance, which may explain why it did not begin to use this measure against Russia, for
instance. Sadurski, 9 Hum Rts L Rev at 429.
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V. C ONCLUSION
This Article shows that the ECHR can increase its reputation by taking
calculated risks. When it issues costly judgments, it risks noncompliance but
gains reputation if the state complies. In some cases the court may try to issue
the costliest judgment that will still gain compliance, but when choosing this
judgment it takes a certain small risk of noncompliance. When the court’s
reputation increases, it can issue costlier judgments and maintain the same
minimal risk of noncompliance. Therefore, as the ECHR obtains compliance
with more cases, its reputation rises, and it will issue more and more demanding
judgments. This explains the incremental increase in the demands of the ECHR
from the states. High-reputation states may be able to respond to this trend of
issuing more and more demanding judgments by strategically failing to comply
with the court or by criticizing it. Therefore, the court will not direct its costliest
judgments against high-reputation states and will issue costlier judgments against
low-reputation states. This hypothesis supports the allegations that the court
shows a double standard and demands more from low-reputation states. When
the court demands only little from a state, it can use novel forms of reasoning
without exceeding the minimum acceptable risk of noncompliance. Over time,
the use of this novel reasoning renders the reasoning more legitimate and
increases the ability of the court to use such reasoning even when issuing costlier
judgments. The court can use novel forms of reasoning against low-reputation
states that cannot deter the court effectively and render this reasoning more
legitimate for future use.
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